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1. Introduction.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that companies who wish to become more international in
their operations seek to hire or promote foreign-born persons to the position of CEO. One
example is the appointment of Egyptian-born Samir Gibara at the helm of Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. in January 1996. In the months leading up to the change of leadership, large
institutional investors such as Alliance Capital and Travelers Group were aggressively buying
Goodyear's stock. One reason for increasing their positions was "the confidence about Mr.
Gibara's centerpiece strategy: overseas growth" (New York Times, March 3, 1996). Another
high-profile example involved the appointment of German-born Michael H. Spindler as CEO of
Apple Computer Inc. in 1986. Facing stiff competition from IBM at the time, Mr. Spindler's
inauguration goal was to boost the company's foreign sales from 22% of revenues to 35%
(Business Week, February 10, 1986).
The first question that naturally arises from such anecdotes is whether these strategies are
truly successful or just the nature of press clippings that accompany these CEO changes. In
general, there appears to be little evidence for significant changes in firms’ operations after a
CEO turnover. Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) examine U.S. CEO turnovers from 1971
through 1989 and find little evidence that CEO turnover systematically affects important firm
performance and operations indicators, including sales, assets, accounting accruals, R&D
expenditures and advertising expenditures. When evidence for significant effects from CEO
turnover is found, it concerns financial variables that are easily manipulated through accepted
accounting practices, such as write-offs of unprofitable investments and moves to reduce
reported income (see e.g., Strong and Meyer, 1987, and Elliott and Shaw, 1988).1
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There is a much more extensive literature on how firm performance may affect the probability of CEO turnover.
Representative papers include Parrino (1997) and Huson et al. (2001). Another strand of the literature considers
compensation and selection of investment projects and include Barron and Waddell (2003) and Smith and Watts
(1993).
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The main contribution of this paper is to document a surprisingly large increase in U.S.
firms’ foreign operations after a CEO turnover from a U.S.-born and -educated CEO to a
foreign-born and -educated CEO. Using a sample of 211 U.S. firms that were part of the
manufacturing section of the Standard and Poor’s 500 over the period 1992-97, we examine
whether changes to CEOs with foreign backgrounds leads these firms to subsequently have
higher proportions of foreign assets or foreign-affiliate sales. Our primary measure of foreign
CEOs is whether these individuals have been either foreign-born or -educated, though we also
examine other observable indicators of CEO backgrounds to measure “foreignness.” Our
empirical results show that, holding other factors constant, the proportion of a firm’s assets and
affiliate sales that are in foreign countries (foreign affiliate asset and sales intensities) increase
when companies change from U.S. CEOs to foreign CEOs. In fact, our preferred estimates show
that foreign-affiliate assets as a proportion of the firm’s total assets rises from an average of 24%
to over 31% for the five years after the CEO change, with the majority of this increase occurring
2-3 years after switch. In similar manner, foreign-affiliate sales as a proportion of a firm’s total
sales rise from 28% to approximately 42% for the five years after the CEO change. In contrast,
foreign affiliate asset and sales intensities for firms experiencing CEO changes that involve only
U.S. born and educated individuals see no such effects.
The substantial increase in foreign operations accompanying firms’ shift to foreign CEOs
has a number of potential explanations. One explanation is network connections. Recent papers
have explored the role of personal, social, and business connections (“networks”) in overcoming
informal barriers to trade such as inadequate information or poor contract enforceability.2 As
evidence for this, Gould (1994), Head and Ries (1998), and Rauch and Trindade (2002)
document that immigrant stocks substantially increase trade flows between the immigrant’s
2

Rauch (2001) provides a literature review of the role of transnational networks in trade flows.
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home and host countries.3 Such network effects allow individuals to exploit trading
opportunities that non-networked individuals may not have observed or were unwilling to
undertake.4 A similar explanation may be offered for why foreign CEOs lead to substantial
expansion of firms’ foreign operations. 5 Personal, social, and business connections that a
foreign CEO has to foreign markets may provide more profitable opportunities for a firm in these
markets than would have otherwise been available.
Alternatively, a firm may have a wide variety of potential expansion strategies at any
given moment, but a foreign CEO may simply have a preference for expansion into foreign
markets. For example, in a candid remark about heritage as a strategy, Gordon Kreh, CEO of
Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Co. says: "Your experience gives you insight....
Coming from abroad, I have more of a global perspective" (The Hartford Courant, March 10,
1997). Another alternative is that firms that plan to undertake significant expansions into foreign
markets appoint foreign CEOs as a signal to the market of the profitability of such expansion
strategies.
While finding evidence to distinguish between these alternative explanations is difficult,
we undertake a few alternative analyses to explore the issue further. First, we examine whether
the increase in foreign market participation for the firms that switch to a foreign CEO are
disproportionately in regions from where the CEO was born and/or educated. We find no
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Rauch and Trindade (2002) further show that such effects of immigrant stocks on trade are larger for trade in
differentiated products, where the value of information is arguably more important, than homogeneous commodities.
4
This issue has become of interest recently in the international trade literature, where substantial evidence has been
found that international trade flows are vastly lower than those predicted by theory (see, e.g., McCallum, 1995).
5
A related literature has found evidence that Japanese business groups (or networks) may promote greater FDI
activity. These include Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1996), Head, Ries, and Swenson (1995), and Blonigen, Ellis
and Fausten (2000). The evidence primarily shows network effects for business groups that have vertical linkages,
making it difficult to identify whether such FDI-promoting effects are due to informational advantages of
networking or agglomeration externalities. Tong (2001) provides evidence that FDI is greater between countries
with common Chinese immigrant stocks, suggesting such network connections amongst ethnic groups can increase
FDI activity. Greaney (forthcoming) presents a theoretical model of networks and FDI activity.
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evidence for this which argues against a networks explanation. On the other hand, we find that
foreign market participation by firms does not decline after a reverse switch from a foreign CEO
to a U.S. CEO. This may be more consistent with a networks explanation, which remain after
established, than with an alternative explanation that suggests firms’ investment strategies are
simply influenced by the CEO’s preferences (global or domestic). Finally, we examine whether
U.S. CEOs with substantial experience heading international operations for major firms elicit
similar foreign market expansion effects when succeeding U.S. CEOs with no such experience.
In other words, do we find similar effects on foreign market participation as those we see when a
company switches to a foreign-born or -educated CEO? We find no such evidence, suggesting
that foreign experiences do not lead to equally strong networks and/or a global perspective as
does heritage and education.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes our empirical
framework. Section three describes the data sample construction and briefly provides descriptive
statistics. Section four discusses the empirical results and section five concludes.

2. Empirical Methodology.
In previous literature, the determinants of FDI have been traditionally examined within
the ownership-location-internalization (OLI) framework developed by Dunning (1977). Most
empirical studies of firms’ FDI activities have found that firms that are larger and have greater
firm-specific intangible assets (typically proxied by R&D and advertising intensity) are also
more likely to have multinational production and sales activities.6 If foreign CEOs have unique
network connections to foreign regions, such connections can be viewed as another type of
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For example, see Morck and Yeung (1992), Pugel et al. (1996), Kogut and Chang (1996), and Belderbos (1997).
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intangible asset that reduces search costs (and perhaps other costs) and therefore encourages the
company to increase its foreign market position, everything else equal.
Given available data (described more below) we focus on two measures of foreign
market position by a firm: foreign asset intensity and foreign sales intensity. Foreign asset
intensity is defined as a firm’s foreign assets as a proportion of its total assets, while foreign sales
intensity is foreign affiliate sales to total firm sales. We use these intensity measures, rather than
levels of foreign assets and sales, since a firm’s size can greatly influence the level of these
foreign-market activities. Our testing equation is then the following:
F_INTit = α + β1RDINTit + β2 ADINTit + ∑ j=0 λi , t − j + 1USFORi , t − j
n

+

∑

n
j= 0

θi , t − j + 1CEOSWITCHi , t − j + εit,

(1)

where i indexes firms, t indexes years, n denotes the number of period lags, and εit is an assumed
zero-mean error term. F_INT represents our foreign intensity variables: foreign-asset intensity,
which we label as FAINT in our tables below, and foreign-sales intensity, which we label
FSINT. As control variables we include R&D intensity (RDINTit) and advertising intensity
(ADINTit), which are proxy variables for firm-specific intangible assets that other studies have
found to increase FDI activity.7
The next set of variables is comprised of indicator variables for various changes in firms’
CEOs, allowing for the possibility of lagged responses. USFOR is our main focus variable
which takes the value of “1” when the firm has changed from a U.S. CEO to a foreign CEO. Our
hypothesis is that the estimated coefficients (λs) on this variable are positive due to anecdotal
evidence that new CEOs with foreign backgrounds direct the firms they lead to become more
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RDINT is constructed as R&D expenditures divided by total assets and ADINT is advertising expenditures divided
by the firm’s total sales.
6

international in their operations. As a control we also include indicator variables for any CEO
changes that occur, which we label CEOSWITCH. It’s not clear what expected signs should be
for the coefficients on the CEOSWITCH variables, particularly given mixed evidence for any
changes following CEO turnovers in previous academic literature. Given this setup, the
coefficients on the USFOR variables will give us the extra effect of a CEO switch from U.S. to
foreign on our dependent variable beyond any changes that occur for all CEO switches.
We note that a contemporaneous correlation between a new foreign CEO and foreignasset and -sales intensities may be difficult to interpret due to endogeneity concerns. Is the new
CEO leading to greater foreign market participation or is the firm’s growth in these areas leading
the firm to have a foreign CEO?8 As our results reveal below, the significant correlations take
place in a lagged fashion, not contemporaneously, largely alleviating this concern over
causation.9
Another issue is that data on firms’ exports sales are unavailable for many firms and,
thus, are not separately analyzed. This certainly may affect our estimates with respect to our
“foreign sales” intensity variable which is defined as the percent of foreign affiliate sales to the
firm’s total sales, the latter of which includes export sales. If a foreign CEO leads a firm to
increase its export sales more than its foreign affiliate sales, our foreign sales measure may go
down, not up. Because of this issue, we will be clearly testing for whether a foreign CEO leads
to greater foreign presence through increased foreign affiliate activity, not export sales activity.
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A few of our firms have a foreign CEO throughout our sample of years. We do not exploit this variation in our
data, given our concern about endogeneity.
9
The market signal hypothesis mentioned in the introduction may imply that a lagged effect would not resolve an
endogeneity bias. Suppose a firm’s managers decide to simultaneously expand into foreign markets and hire a
foreign CEO, but the expansion naturally takes a longer time to come to fruition. In this case, the foreign CEO is
not the reason the firm became more foreign-oriented. But this naturally begs the question of why such a firm
deciding to expand into foreign markets would also want to hire a foreign CEO as part of this same strategy, if the
foreign CEO did not somehow aid such a strategy. The length of the lagged effect also seems long enough to rule
out such a story.
7

On a final note, we also include yearly dummies in our regressions to control for
macroeconomic factors, such as exchange rate movements, and will also examine the inclusion
of firm-fixed effects to control for time-invariant unobserved firm heterogeneity.10

3. Data.
To estimate equation (1) we construct a sample of the 211 firms that were listed in the
manufacturing section of the S&P 500 during the 1992-1997 period. We focus on manufacturing
firms since the bulk of U.S. FDI is by manufacturing firms, with a myriad of foreign regulatory
restrictions facing firms in such sectors as services and telecommunications. Construction of the
sample began with 269 manufacturing firms that were in the S&P 500 throughout our sample
years. Out of this group, 211 companies had complete data for our variables of interest for the 6
years that span the period 1992 through 1997. The choice of timeframe is restricted by the
availability of useable data in the S&P's Compustat database from which most of the data were
collected. Specifically, information on CEO characteristics in the ExecuComp file of Compustat
begins in 1992. Data for years beyond 1997 were excluded due to regulatory changes in
accounting practices that make comparisons of figures in 1997 with subsequent years less
reliable.11
The Industrial Annual Segment of the S&P's Compustat database was the source for
annual data on firms' assets, sales, R&D expenditures, and advertising expenditures. Data on
10

Firms in our sample have varying fiscal years and all variables that vary over time, except the time dummies, are
measured over the associated firm’s fiscal years. This means though that there is not a one-to-one correspondence
with our time dummies and the other time-varying covariates unless the firm’s fiscal year corresponds perfectly with
the calendar year. This occurs in about half our sample of firms. Despite this issue, tests for joint significance of the
year dummies support their inclusion in our regressions below.
11
On June 30, 1997, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued the pronouncement for the Statement
of Financial Accounting Standards No. 131, Disclosure about Segments of an Enterprise and Related Information
(SAFS 131). The statement establishes the standards for the way companies will report information related to
operating segments in their annual and interim financial reports. SFAS 131 has elected to make the new reporting
more relevant than consistent or reliable.
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firms’ foreign assets and foreign sales were obtained using the Geographic Segment file of the
same database.
As noted in the discussion above, there are two sets of dummy variables capturing
information about CEO switches within firms. USFOR is an indicator that the previous CEO
was U.S. and the incoming CEO is “foreign.” CEO switches can be discerned through
information recorded in the ExecuComp file of the Compustat database, which records the names
and positions of firms’ officers on annual basis, as well as other information on executives and
their compensation at publicly traded firms. To classify switches as ones that led to a foreign
CEO we gathered data on whether the company's previous and new CEOs were foreign-born or
foreign-educated through searches of newspaper articles announcing CEO changes from the
Academic Universe (Lexus-Nexus) searchable database and biographical information contained
in the S&P's Register of Corporations, Directors and Executives.12 Information on CEO heritage
revealed that with a few exceptions, foreign-born executives are also foreign educated, and there
are no instances of U.S.-born executives that earned their degrees abroad. Thus, we classify a
CEO as “foreign-connected” if either one of the two criteria is satisfied.
Within our sample, 19 firms have a switch at some point from a U.S. to a foreign CEO
out of 138 (or 13% of) total CEO switches. Table 1 lists information for the 19 cases of foreign
CEO switches in our sample. Some of these relevant switches occurred in years before our
sample starts in 1992 since we examine and find evidence of foreign CEO switch effects up to 5
years after a CEO switch occurs. While U.S.-to-foreign switches represent a relatively small
share of switches, our results are not driven by any outlier, as our results are robust to excluding
observations for any one of the firms that experienced a U.S.-to-foreign switch.
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Newspaper announcements of CEO changes at large firms are surprisingly consistent at giving fairly detailed
biographical information about the incoming and outgoing CEOs.
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In general, U.S. firms with foreign CEOs have greater foreign affiliate sales and foreign
assets. As shown in Table 2, foreign-CEO companies also have higher foreign sales and foreign
asset intensities. Once again, the minimum and maximum intensity measures suggest significant
variation. Foreign sales intensity averages 37% for firms with foreign CEOs versus 27% for
firms with U.S. CEOs. Comparable numbers for foreign asset intensity are 32% and 23%,
respectively. Such results may obtain because foreign-oriented firms naturally promote and hire
foreign managers and CEOs, not that foreign CEOs lead to greater foreign orientation. Our
empirical analysis below will explore more explicitly the direction of the causality.

4. Empirical Results.
4.1. Preliminary Estimates: OLS
Equation (1) was estimated for both of our foreign market intensity variables for the 1266
observations in our sample (211 companies over six years) and the results are presented in Table
3. For our CEO switching variables we begin by including both one- and two-period lags.
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses below our coefficient estimates.
Both regressions have statistically significant F-statistics for overall joint significance of
the regressors, with most of the regressors statistically significant and of expected sign. F-tests
suggest that year effects are not jointly significant, though they are significant when we include
firm fixed-effects, discussed below. The coefficients on R&D and advertising intensity are
positive, as expected, and statistically significant. This is consistent with the FDI internalization
hypothesis that firms with greater intangible assets are more likely to internalize transactions by
establishing plants in foreign markets.

10

We next turn to our variables of interest, the CEO switching variables. In the foreignasset intensity regression, two of the three coefficients on the CEO switch variables are
statistically negative. In fact, the cumulative effect of the CEO switch variables is a 10.5
percentage point drop in a firm’s foreign-asset intensity over the first three years of the new
CEOs tenure. This translates into a very substantial decrease, given our sample foreign-asset
intensity average of 24%, and is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. This
suggests that CEO switches generally lead to a firm reducing its foreign-asset intensity. One
explanation is that CEO switches occur when firms are not performing well, and such changes
cause firms to focus more on domestic operations. The decline in foreign-sales intensity is also
large (7.4 percentage point cumulative decline) relative to the sample average foreign-sales
intensity of 28%.
In contrast, all three coefficients on our USFOR variables are positive in both regression
equations, with both the contemporaneous and two-year lagged variables statistically significant.
Our estimates imply that a company experiencing a switch from a U.S. CEO to a foreign
connected one leads the firm to increase their foreign-asset intensity approximately 22.5
percentage points higher than firms with other CEO switches. Likewise, the coefficients suggest
foreign-sales intensity increases 20.4 percentage points over the first three years of a U.S.-toforeign CEO switch compared to other CEO switches. Combined, the coefficients suggest that a
firm switching from a U.S. to a foreign-connected CEO increases its foreign-asset intensity by 12
percentage points and its foreign-sales intensity by 13 percentage points compared to a firm that
has no CEO switch.13 If we exclude the contemporaneous switching variables due to
endogeneity concerns, the increase in foreign-asset and foreign-sales intensities for a switch to a
13

Given our setup, this marginal effect is calculated as USFOR + USFORt-1 + USFORt-2 + CEOSWITCH +
CEOSWITCHt-1 + CEOSWITCHt-2. These marginal effects are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level
for both regressions.
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foreign-connected CEO yields 7-8 percentage point increases over firms with no such switch. In
related fashion, we tried a specification that included a one-year lead for USFOR variable to
examine whether foreign market participation was increasing before the CEO turnover. The
coefficient on this one-year lead term is approximately -0.50 and statistically insignificant for
both the foreign-asset and foreign-sales intensity equations. Thus, the change in foreign market
participation clearly lags the CEO turnover.

4.2. Firm Fixed-Effects Estimates
While our F-statistic for both regressions in Table 3 is statistically significant, the R2s are
relatively low. One possibility is that foreign market participation by firms may be due to a
variety of unobserved firm characteristics that are not captured by our advertising and R&D
intensity variables. Assuming these unobserved firm-specific features are invariant over our
sample time period, we control for such factors with firm-level fixed effects and present these
estimates in Table 4.
R2s for both equations go up substantially and F-tests strongly support the inclusion of
firm-level fixed effects. The estimates of the other regressors in both equations change
substantially. The coefficients on our CEOSWITCH variables are no longer statistically
negative, suggesting no general effect of a CEO switch on foreign market participation by a firm.
This is more in line with evidence found by Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) regarding changes
in other firm activities following a CEO turnover. The coefficients on the U.S.-to-foreign CEO
switch variables are still positive, as expected, though only the second annual lag coefficient is
statistically significant. The marginal effect of a U.S.-to-foreign switch is much reduced,
suggesting approximately a three percentage point (or roughly 10-15%) increase in both the
foreign asset- and sales-intensity of the firm relative to other firms in the sample. R&D intensity
12

continues to have the correct sign with firm fixed-effects included, but is no longer statistically
significant. Advertising intensity reverses sign and is statistically significant. The poor
performance of these control variables is clearly due to the inclusion of firm fixed effects, since
inclusion of such effects means that the other coefficient estimates are identified solely from the
time series dimension of the data. Annual changes in R&D intensity and advertising intensity
may not be very informative for understanding changes in foreign market participation, whereas
levels of these variables, which proxy for a firm’s stock of intangible assets, are obviously
correlated with a firm’s long-run foreign market participation.
While we expected a lag effect in our CEO switch variables due to the time for a new
CEO to change the direction of the relatively large firms in our sample, the results in Table 4
suggest that we may not have included enough lags and may be missing the full effect of such
switches. In Table 5 we include five years of lags for our CEO switch variables and present
estimates from a firm fixed-effects specification. The inclusion of further lags is important, as
the positive effects from a U.S.-to-foreign CEO switch primarily occur in the second through
fourth year after the CEO switch for both the foreign asset- and sales-intensity variables. The
combined effect on foreign-asset intensity for the six years following a U.S.-to-foreign CEO
switch is 18.3 percentage points (or 75% of the mean) increase and statistically significant at the
95% confidence level. Similarly, the combined effect on foreign-sales intensity for the five years
following a U.S.-to-foreign CEO switch is 21.1 percentage points (or 74% of the mean) increase.
The coefficients on the general CEOSWITCH variables are small and statistically insignificant,
indicating that these marginal effects of the U.S.-to-foreign switch are relative to all other firms
in the sample, regardless of whether they had a CEO switch or not.
Another concern with our specification and sample used in Table 5 is that it includes a
handful of firms that changed CEOs due to a merger of two large firms, including the merger of
13

Pharmacia and Upjohn, which is recorded as a U.S.-to-foreign switch in our data. Mergers can
obviously lead to large discrete changes in the firm’s balance sheet and may provide spurious
results in our regressions. Table 6 presents estimates using the same specification as Table 5, but
dropping the seven firms in our sample that experienced CEO switches due to mergers. While
the coefficients on the USFOR variables continue to be positive and show a similar pattern,
dropping the merged firms does lead to smaller marginal effects. Our coefficients indicate that
the foreign-asset and -sales intensities for the six years after a firm has a U.S.-to-foreign CEO
switch are now 6.1 and 11.5 percentage points, respectively.14 These effects are still substantial
relative to the sample averages, which are not significantly changed by the dropping of the seven
merged firms. Another feature of the USFOR coefficients is that the majority of the increase in
foreign-sales intensity from a U.S.-to-foreign switch lags (by a year or two) the primary increase
in foreign-asset intensity. This accords with the intuition that new sales in a region may lag the
establishment of new production assets in a foreign region. While the switch variables are
sensitive to dropping merged firms, our results are not driven by any of the remaining firms that
experienced a U.S.-foreign switch in our sample. We can exclude any of these firms individually
and generate qualitatively identical results.15
Table 6 results represent our preferred estimates. We also tried including a lagged
dependent variable to control for remaining persistence in foreign market participation not
identified by the firm fixed-effects. While the coefficients on the lagged dependent variables are
statistically significant (around 0.4 for both regressions) the coefficients on the other control
variables are hardly changed.
14

The p-values for these foreign-asset and foreign-sales intensity effects are 0.15 and 0.02. Combining effects for
years one through four after the turnover (where the effects are clearly the most significant), yields a 6.0 percentage
increase in foreign asset intensity with a p-value of 0.01, and a 9.8 percentage point increase in foreign-sales
intensity with a p-value of 0.00.
15
We get somewhat stronger results for our U.S.-foreign CEO effects when we exclude the companies that switched
from a U.S. CEO to a Canadian CEO from our sample.
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4.3. Network Effects as an Explanation
As discussed in the introduction, there are alternative explanations for the significant
increases in foreign market participation we find after a firm switches from a U.S. to a foreign
CEO. One possibility is networks effects, whereby the foreign CEOs personal and business
connections provide new opportunities for expansion into foreign markets. In this section, we
explore the evidence for network effects as much as the data allow.
One possibility for uncovering whether network effects are a factor is to examine whether
the foreign market growth occurs disproportionately more in the region where the foreign CEO
was born and/or educated – what we term as his/her heritage region. Unfortunately, accounting
practices do not specify a standardized method of categorizing foreign regions across countries,
with firms creating region categories as they wish. In addition, firms often report all foreign
transactions as only one category. Nevertheless, we examined the data with respect to the 19
firms that experienced a U.S.-foreign CEO turnover to see if the growth in foreign market
participation in the reported region category that includes the heritage region is greater than the
other foreign regions reported by the firm.
Table 7 shows the 11 firms for which we have relevant data and reports the 3-year growth
rate in assets and sales for the “heritage” region versus other foreign regions. The other 8 firms
were excluded primarily because they did not have their foreign operations broken into more
than one category. Also, one can see that for some of the firms, the reported region that comes
closest to matching the CEO’s heritage is not that close. For example, the new foreign CEO’s
for Kellogg Co. and 3M Co. are Canadian, but these companies report their Canadian operations
in an “Other, Foreign” category. With these limitations in mind, the evidence in table 7 shows
no support for a networks explanation. Sales growth is slower (or declines faster) for the
heritage region in 9 of the 11 firms, while asset growth is slower for the heritage region in 6 of
15

the 11 firms. Assuming a foreign CEO would have the strongest connections in the regions
where he was born and/or educated, we would expect the growth in these variables to be
strongest in the heritage regions.
In Table 8, we try another experiment that potentially yields information on whether
network effects may be behind our results. We have a number of instances where a firm
experiences the reverse switch -- a CEO switch from a foreign CEO to a U.S. CEO. One
hypothesis is that we should expect negative effects on foreign-market participation from such a
switch. This expectation may be most applicable if we believe the U.S.-to-foreign CEO switch
effects are simply driven by foreign CEOs preferences to expand into foreign markets, not
network connections. A new U.S. CEO would presumably not have such a global preference and
reverse the firms’ investment trends. On the other hand, if the U.S.-to-foreign results are due to
additional foreign networking that the foreign-connected CEO has established for the firm, it is
not clear that these connections will necessarily dissipate. If establishing a foreign connection is
primarily a fixed sunk cost, then there may be a beachhead effect such that a change back to a
U.S. CEO does not significantly impact a firm’s foreign market participation. Table 8 presents
results when we run the same sample and specification as in Table 6, but now include
contemporaneous and lagged dummy variables to capture effects from a foreign-to-U.S. CEO
switch. The first four years of a foreign-to-U.S. CEO switch indicate negative effects on both
foreign-asset and -sales intensities. However, the combined effects are not as large as the
coefficients on the U.S.-to-foreign CEO switch variables and also not statistically significant.
Thus, the evidence for a reversal effect is weak, perhaps due to beachhead effects that come from
establishing network connections.
To this point we have used foreign birth or education as the sole indication of foreign
connections for an individual. But there may be other ways in which U.S.-born and -educated
16

individuals may establish important network connections. To explore this we examined
biographical information on U.S. CEO’s previous experiences to see if they had either run an
“international” section of a firm’s operations and/or lived abroad for a significant amount of
time. Using this definition of “foreign” connections we created alternative variables for U.S.-toforeign CEO switches (ALT USFOR) and include these in our specification in Table 9 with five
year lags to be consistent with the other CEO switch variables. Interestingly, there is no
consistent effect seen in these U.S.-to-foreign switches using the alternative, more-inclusive
definition of a foreign-connected CEO. Other variables, including our standard U.S.-to-foreign
CEO switch variables are essentially unchanged. This evidence would argue against network
effects to the extent one believes that U.S. CEOs heading international operations of foreign
firms (or living abroad) gain valuable connection in foreign markets.

5. Conclusion.
This paper documents a striking increase in U.S. firms’ FDI activity after a switch to a
CEO that is foreign-born and/or foreign-educated. Our preferred estimates show that a U.S.
firm’s switch from a U.S.- to foreign-connected CEO leads to 30% and 50% increases in that
firm’s proportion of its foreign affiliates’ assets and sales, respectively, over the 5 years
following the switch. This is in contrast to other CEO switches in our sample that show no
evidence of changes in these proportions after the switch. The effect also comes through as a
response that lags the turnover by a number of years, suggesting that the foreign CEO is leading
to the foreign market participation change, not the other way around. This significant increase in
foreign market activity from a foreign CEO turnover is consistent with anecdotal evidence
(mainly press releases), but is surprising in light of previous studies that find little evidence of
changes in other measures of firm performance after CEO turnover.
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The economic forces behind such effects are more difficult to identify. One possibility is
network effects – personal and business connections of foreign CEOs allow them to exploit
opportunities in foreign markets that would be unavailable to the firm without such connections.
However, our evidence shows that foreign-market participation by firms experiencing U.S.-toforeign CEO turnovers is not disproportionately in the regions where one would expect the
foreign CEO’s connections to be strongest. In addition, when we examine CEO switches to
individuals that have previous experience running the international operations of a firm,
experience that would presumably lead to development of international network connections, we
find no effect of such CEO switches on the firm’s FDI activities.
Ruling out network effects leaves us with alternative explanations that have less
traditional economic explanations. One alternative explanation is that a firm may have a wide
variety of potential expansion strategies at any given moment, but a foreign CEO may have a
global perspective that gives him/her a preference for expansion into foreign markets. A second
alternative is that there is a market signaling advantage to naming a foreign CEO when a firm
decides to make a significant expansion into a foreign market. The lagged response of the
foreign market expansion would be consistent with this story if there are significant adjustment
costs to implementing the firm’s expansion abroad plans. The lengthy lags in our estimates may
make this alternative explanation less likely, however. We leave these issues for future research
efforts.
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TABLE 1. CEO Switches from U.S. to Foreign in Sample.

Company

Foreign CEO

Switch
Year

Country of
Foreign CEO
Birth

3Com Corp.
Alberto-Culver Co.
American Greetings
Apple Computer
Becton Dickinson & Co.
Campbell Soup Co.
Compaq Computer Corp.
Ford Motor Co.
General Dynamics Corp.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Intel Corp.
Kellogg Co.
Mead Corp.
3M Co.
National Service Ind.
Pharmacia & Upjohn
Philip Morris Cos. Inc.
Rubbermaid Inc.
Warner Lambert Co.

Eric Benhamou
Howard Bernick
Morry Weiss
Michael Spindler
Clateo Castellini
David Willis Johnson
Eckhard Pfeiffer
Alexander Trotman
William Anders
Samir Gibara
Andrew Grove
Arnold Langbo
Steven Mason
Livio DeSimone
Sidney Kirschner
Ley Smith
Geoffrey Bible
Wolfgang Schmitt
Melvin Goodes

1990
1994
1987
1993
1994
1990
1991
1993
1991
1996
1987
1992
1992
1991
1987
1993
1994
1992
1991

Algeria
Canada
Czechoslovakia
Germany
Italy
Australia
Germany
U.K.
Hong Kong
Egypt
Hungary
Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada
Australia
Germany
Canada

Country of
Foreign CEO
Undergraduate
Degree
France
Canada
U.S.
Germany
Italy
Australia
Germany
U.S.
U.S.
Egypt
U.S.
Canada
U.S.
Canada
U.S.
Canada
Australia
U.S.
Canada

TABLE 2. Foreign-Asset and Foreign-Sales Intensities for Sample Companies over the
Period, 1992-97.
Average Foreign-Sales Intensity
(Percent of Total Sales)
Companies Companies
with U.S.- with ForeignAll
born CEOs born CEOs Companies
(N = 183)
(N = 28)
(N = 211)
Mean
27
37
28
Median
26
42
27
Maximum
104
67
104
Minimum
0
5
0

Average Foreign-Asset Intensity
(Percent of Total Assets)
Companies Companies
with U.S.- with foreignAll
born CEOs born CEOs Companies
(N = 183)
(N = 28)
(N = 211)
23
32
24
23
36
25
65
56
65
0
0
0

Notes: Foreign sales exceed total sales in one instance where the company (Fortune Brands Inc.) was
engaged in the production of commodities (such as tobacco, liquor, oil, etc.) that are subject to excises
taxes. Such taxes are included in the computation of foreign sales but netted out of total company sales.
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TABLE 3. OLS Estimates of Foreign CEO Switch Effects on Foreign-Sales
and Foreign-Asset Intensities.
Explanatory
Variables
USFOR
USFOR(t-1)
USFOR(t-2)
CEOSWITCH
CEOSWITCH(t-1)
CEOSWITCH(t-2)
RDINT
ADINT

Year Dummies
R-squared

Foreign-Asset Intensity
(N = 1266)

Foreign-Sales Intensity
(N = 1266)

8.59**
(3.71)
4.45
(3.32)
9.43**
(3.71)
- 4.31***
(1.50)
- 2.21
(1.55)
- 3.97**
(1.60)
1.14***
(0.12)
0.77***
(0.15)

7.85*
(4.21)
4.52
(4.16)
8.02*
(4.16)
- 2.75
(1.92)
- 1.47
(1.90)
- 3.22*
(1.78)
1.68***
(0.14)
0.90***
(0.17)

YES

YES

0.11

0.15
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TABLE 6. Firm Fixed-Effects Estimates of Foreign CEO Switch Effects on ForeignSales and Foreign-Asset Intensities: Dropping Merged Firms.
Explanatory
Variables
USFOR
USFOR(t-1)
USFOR(t-2)
USFOR(t-3)
USFOR(t-4)
USFOR(t-5)
CEOSWITCH
CEOSWITCH(t-1)
CEOSWITCH(t-2)
CEOSWITCH(t-3)
CEOSWITCH(t-4)
CEOSWITCH(t-5)
RDINT
ADINT

Year Dummies
Firm Dummies

Foreign-Asset Intensity
(N = 1224)

Foreign-Sales Intensity
(N = 1224)

1.72
(1.12)
1.92*
(1.03)
3.02**
(1.19)
1.74
(1.12)
1.18
(1.31)
- 0.51
(1.63)
- 0.77
(0.69)
0.09
(0.62)
- 0.92
(0.76)
- 0.61
(0.68)
- 0.38
(0.67)
- 0.42
(0.79)
0.37
(0.24)
- 0.57***
(0.17)

1.56
(1.23)
1.90*
(0.97)
4.02***
(1.33)
3.54***
(1.24)
3.47***
(1.23)
1.04
(1.49)
- 0.42
(0.64)
- 0.40
(0.62)
- 1.50
(1.02)
- 0.61
(0.63)
- 0.58
(0.62)
- 0.51
(0.80)
0.24
(0.16)
- 0.07
(0.15)

YES
YES

YES
YES

R-squared
0.92
0.95
F-Statistic
3.13
4.26
Prob. (F-Statistic)
0.000
0.000
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and *, denote significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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TABLE 7: Three-Year Growth in Foreign Affiliate Sales and Assets in Foreign-CEO Heritage Region and Other Foreign Regions After
CEO Turnover.
3-Year Growth Rates After CEO Turnover

Sales Growth
Company

CEO’s birth place/
education place

Apple Computer

Germany/Germany

Reported Region That
Most Closely Corresponds
to CEO Heritage
Africa, Middle East, Europe

Becton Dickinson & Co. Italy/Italy

Europe

Campbell Soup Co.

Australia

Australia/Australia

Asset Growth

Other
Foreign
Regions

Heritage
Region

Other
Foreign
Regions

-20.5%

-9.6%

-31.5%

-33.2%

10.2%

15.0%

67.5%

42.7%

3.1%

26.8%

4.4%

55.8%

Heritage
Region

Compaq Computer Corp. Germany/Germany

Europe

184.7%

459.8%

97.4%

360.6%

Ford Motor Co.

Europe

14.5%

46.4%

23.8%

15.7%

-12.3%

16.3%

36.3%

53.7%

U.K./U.S.

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Egypt/Egypt

Eastern Europe, Africa, Middle East

Intel Corp.

Hungary/U.S.

Europe

55.8%

51.1%

124.1%

10.9%

Kellogg Co.

Canada/Canada

Other, Foreign

14.1%

16.2%

16.8%

21.4%

3M Co.

Canada/Canada

Other, Foreign

-13.3%

35.6%

-1.5%

33.3%

Philip Morris Cos. Inc.

Australia/Australia

Asia, Australia, Canada, Other

69.4%

9.1%

17.6%

-4.6%

Warner Lambert Co.

Canada/Canada

Asia, S. America, N. America

41.0%

47.9%

55.4%

129.4%

Notes: Three-year growth rates calculated from Compustat data and corporate 10-K reports. Growth figures for Goodyear Tire and Rubber concern only tire
operations, which represented 85% of firm’s total sales in 2000.
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TABLE 8. Firm Fixed-Effects Estimates of Foreign CEO Switch Effects on ForeignSales and Foreign-Asset Intensities: Examining Foreign to U.S. CEO Switches.
Explanatory
Variables
USFOR
USFOR(t-1)
USFOR(t-2)
USFOR(t-3)
USFOR(t-4)
USFOR(t-5)
CEOSWITCH
CEOSWITCH(t-1)
CEOSWITCH(t-2)
CEOSWITCH(t-3)
CEOSWITCH(t-4)
CEOSWITCH(t-5)
FORUS
FORUS(t-1)
FORUS(t-2)
FORUS(t-3)
FORUS(t-4)
FORUS(t-5)
RDINT
ADINT

Year Dummies
Firm Dummies

Foreign-Asset Intensity
(N = 1224)

Foreign-Sales Intensity
(N = 1224)

1.64
(1.14)
1.67
(1.07)
2.74**
(1.21)
1.47
(1.13)
1.27
(1.38)
- 0.01
(1.64)
- 0.60
(0.71)
0.39
(0.63)
- 0.59
(0.77)
- 0.28
(0.71)
- 0.42
(0.70)
- 0.75
(0.80)
- 1.09
(1.92)
- 2.13
(2.34)
- 1.60
(2.29)
- 1.83
(1.79)
0.53
(1.43)
3.44
(2.87)
0.35
(0.24)
- 0.58***
(0.17)

1.49
(1.21)
1.82*
(0.99)
4.05***
(1.40)
3.42***
(1.18)
3.57***
(1.27)
1.37
(1.54)
- 0.30
(0.67)
- 0.30
(0.65)
- 1.41
(1.08)
- 0.50
(0.66)
- 0.67
(0.66)
- 0.69
(0.82)
- 1.35
(1.56)
- 0.76
(1.39)
- 0.54
(1.64)
- 0.69
(1.62)
0.50
(1.37)
1.72
(3.63)
0.23
(0.16)
- 0.07
(0.14)

YES
YES

YES
YES

R-squared
0.92
0.95
F-Statistic
2.55
3.33
Prob. (F-Statistic)
0.000
0.000
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and *, denote significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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TABLE 9. Firm Fixed-Effects Estimates of Foreign CEO Switch Effects on ForeignSales and Foreign-Asset Intensities: Alternative Definition of Foreign Connections.
Explanatory
Variables
USFOR
USFOR(t-1)
USFOR(t-2)
USFOR(t-3)
USFOR(t-4)
USFOR(t-5)
CEOSWITCH
CEOSWITCH(t-1)
CEOSWITCH(t-2)
CEOSWITCH(t-3)
CEOSWITCH(t-4)
CEOSWITCH(t-5)
ALT USFOR
ALT USFOR(t-1)
ALT USFOR(t-2)
ALT USFOR(t-3)
ALT USFOR(t-4)
ALT USFOR(t-5)
RDINT
ADINT
Year Dummies
Firm Dummies

Foreign-Asset Intensity
(N = 1224)

Foreign-Sales Intensity
(N = 1224)

1.37
(1.25)
1.72
(1.09)
2.34*
(1.20)
1.59
(1.16)
1.31
(1.34)
- 0.59
(1.65)
- 0.81
(0.77)
0.19
(0.65)
- 0.28
(0.74)
- 0.54
(0.71)
- 0.59
(0.68)
- 0.39
(0.79)
0.46
(1.03)
- 0.06
(1.36)
- 2.92
(1.79)
0.98
(1.34)
2.76**
(1.36)
0.42
(2.10)
0.37
(0.24)
- 0.57***
(0.17)

1.42
(1.30)
1.93*
(1.07)
3.59**
(1.42)
3.39***
(1.26)
3.42***
(1.26)
0.83
(1.47)
- 0.37
(0.71)
- 0.33
(0.66)
- 1.03
(1.13)
- 0.45
(0.66)
- 0.55
(0.65)
- 0.33
(0.74)
- 0.55
(1.24)
- 0.47
(1.42)
- 2.78
(1.80)
- 0.92
(1.31)
- 0.18
(1.44)
- 1.76
(3.30)
0.23
(0.16)
- 0.08
(0.14)

YES
YES

YES
YES

R-squared
0.92
0.95
F-Statistic
3.45
3.53
Prob. (F-Statistic)
0.000
0.000
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and *, denote significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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